A CGE model is used to analyze the impact of public school financing on private school attendance. The common perception that public school finance centralization will necessarily lead to greater private school attendance is not correct in such a model-even when that centralization involves an extreme equalization as in California. Furthermore, if centralization is less dramatic (as in most states), declines in private school attendance are even more pronounced. This weakens the speculation that low exit rates to private schools in centralizing states imply that general public school quality does not drop as a result of such centralization.
INTRODUCTION
Primary and secondary public education in the United States is subject to two important forces that have previously been dubbed "voice" and "exit" (Hirschman, 1970) . A vast majority of parents send their children to public schools and "voice" their preferences through the political process, their choice of school districts, and their involvement in local schools. A small but sizeable minority (12.8%), on the other hand, "exit" the public system and choose private schools for their children. My aim in this article is to address the extent to which public school financing institutions may impact the decision of parents to choose the second of these options in light of the general equilibrium forces inherent in any districtbased public school system. These general equilibrium forces are shown to be not only theoretically interesting but also potentially large in magnitude, and they suggest that conventional wisdom regarding the theoretical impact of public school finance centralization on private school attendance rates may need modification.
The "Direct" Effect of Centralization on Private School Attendance.
To clarify issues, suppose that the choice a state faces is between (i) pure local funding of public schools (determined through local voting on property tax rates) under which large differences in spending levels may emerge across school districts, and (ii) pure state funding (determined through state-wide voting on income tax rates) under which all public schools receive the same funding per pupil. Conventional wisdom on the impact of such state versus local public school financing institutions on private school attendance is then straightforward and closely related to Oates' decentralization theorem (Oates, 1972) . Local provision of public goods and services, under this view, allows differing households to self-select (Tiebout, 1956 ) into jurisdictions whose tax/public goods packages match most closely with household preferences. Since state financing would equalize spending in all districts at levels somewhere between the high and low levels of spending observed under local financing, 2 individual households that value education are thus less able to use Tiebout sorting to achieve their preferred spending levels under state financing and thus have a greater incentive to exit the public system. Therefore, the prediction arising from this conventional wisdom is that state financing will lead to an increase in the share of households choosing private schools for their children even if public schools themselves utilize resources no less efficiently under centralization (as is often hypothesized in the literature). The fact that private school attendance has not increased significantly as a result of centralization in some of the most studied cases (such as California) has therefore been suggested to imply that parents view state-run (equalized) public schools similarly in quality to locally run schools. After all, they clearly are not responding in large numbers by "exiting" the centralized public system but rather continue to exercise their "voice" within the public system. 3 Even the logic of the decentralization theorem, however, gives rise to a much more ambiguous prediction once we take into account that private school attendance occurs as much in poor districts as it does in wealthy ones. If equalization lowers public school quality in wealthy areas (thus causing an increase in private school attendance), it presumably also raises quality in poor areas (thus causing a decrease in private school attendance there). The net effect on statewide private school attendance is therefore not at all clear even when we simply consider these direct or partial equilibrium forces. In addition, however, this article suggests that there may exist a much more sizeable indirect or general equilibrium force that arises through housing markets and that pushes further in the direction of less private school attendance under centralization.
The "Indirect" Effect of Centralization on Private School Attendance.
Elsewhere (Nechyba, 1996 (Nechyba, , 1997a (Nechyba, , 1997b (Nechyba, , 1999 (Nechyba, , 2000 Nechyba and Heise, 2000) , I have argued that an analysis of fiscal federalism which ignores important general equilibrium effects may be misleading and that the limited availability of housing options within urban environments might play a significant role. 4 Household choices regarding schooling are made as part of a larger choice problem in which parents choose where to live, where to send their children to school, and how to vote in local and state elections, and the interaction of these choices determines housing market equilibria as well as local political equilibria. Therefore, it is often difficult to think of issues such as those related to public school finance institutions without evaluating carefully the full general equilibrium in which household decisions are made.
Under local financing, for example, differences in school quality tend to cause housing prices in low-income communities to be depressed and those in highincome communities to be inflated. So long as desirable neighborhoods of houses exist within poor school quality districts, these capitalizations of school quality differences into housing prices may cause some households that choose private schools to settle in such neighborhoods-both to reduce their property tax burden and to take advantage of depressed housing values. But this capitalization will diminish under central financing as public school quality in the poor districts improves relative to the wealthier districts, and the switch to state income taxation eliminates the possibility for private-school-attending households to lower their tax burden by living in low school quality districts. Private school attendees who choose to live in poor districts under local public school financing in order to take advantage of depressed housing values and lower property tax payments therefore lose both these incentives under a move to centralized public school financing. Given the substantial and increasing empirical evidence that such capitalization effects exists in general, that they conform to predictions of the model employed in this article and that voters are aware of them, it does not seem implausible that they could in fact play an important role.
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This does not, however, invalidate the insights from the Oates decentralization theorem-it simply adds another dimension to an already complicated picture and thus tilts the balance away from the presumption that centralization ought to be accompanied by increases in private school attendance. Whereas a move to state financing would cause increases in private school attendance in high-income school districts precisely because of the decentralization theorem logic, this may be offset by both, the direct partial equilibrium effect of lower private school attendance in poor districts (alluded to in the previous section) and the indirect general 4 See Bayer (1999) for evidence on the impact of limited housing options in good school districts. From a theoretical perspective, inelasticities in housing and/or the number of communities must be present in order for capitalization to take place, and the evidence suggests that such inelasticities are pervasive. The mere presence of capitalization is therefore a refutation of the full Tiebout model as any such capitalization represents opportunities for builders and community founders to make profits (Edel and Scalar, 1974) .
5 A long literature on capitalization has evolved from Oates' (1969) seminal paper, of which Black (1999) is a recent innovative example. Nechyba and Strauss (1998) use a discrete choice model to explain residential choice based on local public finance factors. Most recently, Brunner et al. (2000) provide evidence of voters in California's voucher initiative being driven by capitalization effects predicted by Nechyba (2000) , and Reback (2000) provides evidence of similar capitalization effects in Minnesota's open enrollment program. equilibrium effect introduced here. Under the assumption that public schools use resources equally efficiently under both centralization and decentralization, it is then eminently plausible that private school attendance declines with centralization of public school financing. Furthermore, this could similarly hold for cases where centralization indeed leads to a somewhat less-efficient use of resources in the public sector. As a consequence, the empirical observation of little change in statewide private school attendance after centralization has little say about the relative efficiency of resource use in centralized versus decentralized public school systems.
Some Stylized Facts and the Plan of This
Article. Although a number of prior papers have analyzed the implication of school finance on a variety of issues, 6 relatively few have investigated the impact of public school finance institutions on private school enrollments. 7 A cursory look at the stylized facts across states, however, does not lend overwhelming support to the conventional wisdom that centralization (and equalization) of school finance should lead to greater private school attendance levels. Table 1 reports the number of school children enrolled in private schools as a percentage of all school children for each of the 50 states, as well as the fraction of public school funding from local sources. Abstracting from other issues (particularly the important price effects raised by Hoxby, 1998) , conventional wisdom would suggest a negative relationship between these two variables, with less local funding leading to higher private school enrollment. But such an effect is not immediately apparent in the data. Similarly, much has been written on the California experience of the 1970s when the state centralized and equalized spending on public schools. Although the state experienced a sizeable growth in the number of private schools (Downes and Greenstein, 1996) , the total percentage of children attending private schools over the next two decades increased relatively modestly.
8 Little has been done in terms of theoretical work to shed light on these stylized facts-thus leaving the door open for the interpretation that these facts are only consistent with the notion that public schools do not change much under centralization.
Therefore, in order to analyze the magnitudes of various offsetting partial and general equilibrium effects inherent in school finance debates, this article calibrates a rich theoretical model of local public school districts to data from New Jersey and simulates various types of movements from local public school financing to greater centralization. The model builds on Nechyba (1996) where the impact 6 See, for example, Murray et al. (1998) , Hoxby (1998 ), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996 , Benabou (1996) , Sonstelie and Silva (1995) , Epple and Romano (1995) , to cite a few. 7 Many researchers have investigated various aspects of the private/public school choice without focusing on the interactions with public school financing institutions. Recent examples of these include Downes (1996) , Hoxby (1994) , Hamilton and Macauley (1991) , and Long and Toma (1988) . Schmidt (1992) also falls into this category but presents some evidence of a link between revenue limits and private school share.
8 Sonstelie (1979) and Sonstelie et al. (2000) argue that the move from local to state finance had little impact on private school enrollments while Downes and Schoeman (1998) as well has Hoxby (1998) present evidence that the state's increase in private enrollments from 1970 to 1980 can at least in part be attributed to a change in public school finance regimes. of different state aid formulas on local public choices and migrations is investigated in the absence of private alternatives to the local public good. I expand this framework along the lines suggested in Nechyba (1999 Nechyba ( , 2000 to make it particularly relevant to the school finance debate. Whereas previous versions of the model have not been calibrated to existing private school attendance levels observed in the data, I expand the model here in order to be able to replicate important features of the data (such as private school attendance rates) more effectively. Although computationally more demanding, this expansion of the model allows me to calibrate the model explicitly to reflect current levels of private school attendance in different communities, and then to focus on the impact of changes in the school finance regime on private school enrollments, both statewide and in particular communities. Section 2 presents the theoretical model used in the remainder of the article. Section 3 focuses on the calibration of the model as well as the calculation of the benchmark equilibrium that replicates the observed data. Section 4 then turns to the main question in the article: What happens to private school attendance when financing of public schools is moved from the local to the state level? In Section 5, I consider some other less extreme forms of centralization that involve matching and block grants in order to identify additional effects of such centralization schemes as well as to demonstrate the robustness of the main conclusion that centralization is likely to lead to declines in overall private school attendance regardless of what precise form the centralization takes. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL
The theoretical model is essentially that presented in Nechyba (2000) , but the computational version is extended to a significantly larger number of household types and a more empirically relevant private school sector. The model builds a private school market into a well-defined local public goods economy first explored in Nechyba (1997a) and employs policy formulations previously conducted under the assumption that there are no private alternatives to the local public good (Nechyba, 1996) . It takes as given the boundaries that divide a fixed set of houses into school districts and places no a priori restrictions on the mix of house and neighborhood qualities within and across these boundaries. This allows the model to accommodate the empirically important possibility of the coexistence of rich and poor "neighborhoods" within a single school district.
9 Each household is endowed with a house (which can be sold at the market price), a parental income level, and an ability level for its one child. Parents take endowments as given and choose (i) where to live, (ii) whether to send their child to the local public or a private school, and (iii) how to vote in local or state elections (depending on the 9 For evidence on the empirical importance of within-district variance in house quality as opposed to across-district variance, see Epple and Sieg (1999) . At the same time, however, the assumed exogeneity of the housing stock and neighborhood effects and the fixed nature of the political boundaries make the model ill suited for explaining either the evolution of observed intra-district neighborhood structures or the formation of political jurisdictions. Instead, the model seems most appropriate for analyzing policy issues for a relatively stable and developed urban/suburban economy-the type of economy in which capitalization effects are well documented and by themselves point to the presence of inelastic housing supplies such as those modeled here (Edel and Scalar, 1974) . finance regime that is in place) on the level of per pupil public school spending. Private schools hold an advantage over public schools in that they can set admissions requirements whereas public schools have to accept all students living within the district. A more formal exposition of these elements of the model follows.
2.1. Community Structure and Households. A fixed school district and neighborhood structure Households are endowed with income, a house, a child with some exogenous ability level, and preferences over the consumption set. More precisely, the unit interval N = [0, 1], which represents the set of houses also represents the set of households, and household n is defined to be that household which is initially endowed with house n. Furthermore, a private good endowment function z: N → R + divides this set of households into a finite set of "income types."
11 Finally, each household n ∈ N has one child, 12 and ability levels for that child are assigned via a function a: N → R + (which may be correlated with household income).
Each household n ∈ N is then assumed to act as one utility-maximizing agent with utility function u n : D × H × R 2 + → R + that takes as its arguments the district and neighborhood the household lives in, its private good consumption c ∈ R + , and the perceived school quality level s ∈ R + enjoyed by the household's child. When choosing schools and districts, each household therefore solves the following maximization problem:
More precisely, the set of houses is defined as part of a measure space (N, N, µ) where µ is taken to be the Lebesgue measure. All subsets referred to are henceforth assumed to be measurable. 11 The assumption of finiteness of the number of income types is made for technical reasons related to the existence of an equilibrium. These issues are discussed in detail in Nechyba (1997a) . 12 In reality, the average number of children per household is roughly 0.5 whereas the assumption of a single child per household in this model fixes that average at 1. Others (Epple and Romano, 1998 , for instance) have handled this by assuming only half a child per household. It is unclear what the right assumption should be. A large fraction of the elderly, for instance, tends to be in favor of increased public school funding for reasons that are not well understood. One interpretation of having "too many vote" children in the model is that each child "counts" for more than one household. As noted in Nechyba (2000) , this causes the total spending per pupil to be too high (when the model is calibrated to replicate current per pupil spending) but it may capture the underlying behavioral parameters relevant for mobility more closely. NECHYBA where g = 1 if the household chooses a private school of quality s p at tuition T; 13 s d is the public school quality in district d; p n is the market value of the house n with which household n is endowed; p dh is the price of house h in district d; t 0 is the state income tax rate; and t d is the property tax rate in district d. Since each household is infinitesimal with respect to the market, it takes all variables other than the choice variables as given (although these variables are, of course, all determined as part of the general equilibrium).
Public and Private Schools.
Both public and private schools face the same technology that takes as its inputs per pupil spending as well as the peer composition of the school to produce the output s that enters utility functions. A child's peer quality q n : R 2 + → R + is jointly determined by his parents' income level and his own ability.
14 School quality is then given by the production function f : R k+1 + → R + that takes as its arguments per pupil spending and k moments of the distribution of student peer qualities. In practice, the model that is operationalized in the next section restricts itself to one moment of this distribution-the average peer quality within the school. Although public and private schools share the same production function, they differ in two important respects: First, public schools have to accept anyone into the school so long as the household resides within the district whereas private schools can set minimum admission standards; and second, public school funding levels are determined through a public choice process whereas private school spending is determined through perfectly competitive private school markets.
More precisely, let η ⊆ N be the subset of households that choose to send their children to public school, and let J d be the set of households residing in school district d. Then x d -per pupil spending in district d-under a system with at least some locally determined revenue is
where t d is the majority rule local property tax rate in district d; 15 AID d is the total state aid received by district d (and funded by a proportional state income tax) determined through an exogenously specified formula; and
is the local property tax base (which varies with the endogenously determined house price function p : D × H → R + that assigns a unique price p dh to each house type in each district). Although voters take into account the state aid formula in their local elections, they are otherwise assumed to be myopic in that they take community composition and property values as given when going to the polls. 16 Under a pure state system with no local funding, on the other hand, per pupil spending in all districts is equalized and funded by a state majority-determined income tax rate t 0 , i.e.,
Finally, peer composition in public schools is simply determined by the characteristics of the set of households that reside within the school district and choose not to send their child to private school (µ(η ∩ J d )).
In contrast, private schools are assumed to choose admissions standards (thus explicitly restricting access) and tuition rates so as to maximize profit in a perfectly competitive private school market. Each private school therefore announces two characteristics: the tuition rate that is charged per child, and the minimum peer quality accepted into the school. 17 Given that there are no set-up costs or increasing returns in the production technology f faced by private schools, it is then immediate that all parents whose children attend a particular private school must be of the same endowment and peer type in equilibrium, and that they pay tuition that is exactly equal to their most preferred level of per pupil spending. 18 This, then, is the source of the competitive advantage of the private over the public sector: it offers spending levels that may be more in line with particular household preferences, and it takes advantage of peer contributions to education output by excluding peer qualities below some minimum standard. In equilibrium, private schools are thus quite heterogeneous across schools but homogeneous within any given school.
2.3.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium in this model consists of a list {J, t, s, p, η} that includes a partition of households into districts and neighborhoods J, state and local tax rates t ∈ R D+1 + (where t 0 is the state income tax rate and t d is the property 16 Such voter myopia is technically convenient and thus relatively standard in the literature (see Epple et al., 1993; Dunz, 1986; Rose-Ackerman, 1979 ). In our case, it guarantees single peakedness of preferences in the absence of private schools (Nechyba, 1997a) . To obtain single peakedness in the presence of private schools, it is also assumed that households take their private/public choice as given when voting on public school spending. Although this results in the existence of equilibria where no public schools are funded, the simulations ignore such equilibria unless they are the only ones generated by the model. For more details, see Nechyba (1999) . 17 Note that, for technical reasons in part exposited in Nechyba (1999) , this differs from the model of Epple and Romano (1998) in which schools discriminate in their tuition policies.
18 Suppose, for a moment, that this were not the case. In particular, suppose that a private school provided education to children of two different income types. Then a new school that offered admission only to the higher income type (at the same tuition) would improve the utility of the higher income parents (because of the higher overall peer quality achieved through selective admissions). Under free entry, such a school would in fact arise. Similarly, free entry eliminates all tuition levels other than those most preferred by parents. For a formal proof of this, see Nechyba (1999) .This is similar to the familiar logic that underlies the Hamilton (1975) local public finance result that zoning results in homogeneous communities. In that model, communities (rather than private schools) fix a local tax/spending package (analogous to tuition levels) and set a minimum zoning (rather than peer quality) level. Nechyba (1999) also pointed out that the assumptions made here are formally equivalent to treating private schools as excludable clubs under an equal cost-sharing rule.
and a specification of the subset of the population that attends public rather than private schools η ⊆ N. It can be defined formally as follows:
DEFINITION. An equilibrium is a list {J, t, s, p, η} such that 
4. At prices p, households cannot gain utility by moving and/or changing schools; 5. Each household is able to choose a private school that offers its own peer group and charges the household's most preferred tuition (that equals per pupil spending within the school), i.e., private school markets are perfectly competitive.
For a thorough discussion of the existence and uniqueness properties of this equilibrium, see Nechyba (1997a Nechyba ( , 1999 Nechyba ( , 2000 .
CALIBRATION TO THE BENCHMARK EQUILIBRIUM
The calibrated computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used in the policy simulations of Sections 4 and 5 sets H = 5 and D = 3. This implies the existence of 15 different neighborhoods spread over three school districts. The school districts are of equal size (i.e., {µ(C 1 ), µ(C 2 ), µ(C 3 )} = {1/3, 1/3, 1/3}) as are the neighborhoods within districts (i.e., µ(
. These districts are intended to be representative of the several hundred low-income, middle-income, and high-income school districts located in four New Jersey counties (Bergen, Hudson, Essex, and Union counties) that include the suburbs of New York City.
3.1. Data Used for Calibration. More specifically, using the 1990 School District Data Book (National Center for Education Statistics, 1995) and Census (Bureau of the Census, 1992) data from all districts in these four counties, school districts in these four counties were divided into three categories by median household income such that each category ended up with roughly equal numbers of households. Table 2 gives summary statistics for each class of districts. From price data on houses in the various district types I am able to infer neighborhood quality parameters that enter directly into utility functions by a process described in detail in Section 3.5. For now I simply note that this calibration translates a nearcontinuum of house qualities observed for each district type into five discrete quality intervals (neighborhoods) of equal sizes. More precisely, one-fifth of all houses in district d are assigned the house/neighborhood quality of the median house observed in the data for that district and are labeled houses of neighborhood type h = 3. Similarly, neighborhoods 2 and 4 represent "somewhat below average" and "somewhat above average" house qualities, respectively, and one-fifth of all houses within district d are assigned quality levels corresponding to those observed at the 30th and 70th quality percentile for that district type. Finally, neighborhoods 1 and 5 represent the worst and best houses in a particular district, and one-fifth of all houses in district d are assigned the quality level observed for the houses in the 10th and 90th percentile (respectively). Note that when I employ price data to calibrate house qualities within districts, I capture both characteristics of the houses and characteristics of the neighborhoods in one measure. Thus, the model allows for both neighborhood externalities and amenities as well as house qualities to determine the character of neighborhoods (or house types) within school districts.
Endowments and Preferences.
The income endowment function z : N → R + chosen for the CGE model creates 20 income types and replicates a discretized version of the actual household income distribution observed for the New Jersey districts used in the calibration. Incomes in the model therefore range from 1 (corresponding to $10,000) to 20 (corresponding to $200,000), and the measure of agents with different levels of income is given by the observed household income distribution in the data. It should be kept in mind that this eliminates from the model extremely poor and extremely wealthy households by truncating the income distribution at 1 and 20. Given that it is likely that such extreme households are often motivated by factors quite different from the middle class (broadly defined), however, this appears to be a minor limitation of the model.
Each of the 20 income types is initially spread uniformly across all neighborhoods (in all school districts) when house endowments are assigned. Given that this is a static model calibrated to annual data, the "value" of a house is defined as the annualized flow of housing/neighborhood services from that house. Furthermore, it is important to note that, although some low-income households are endowed with high-quality houses, this does not imply that these low-income households actually live in high-priced houses in equilibrium. The endogenously determined value of these endowments (i.e., the value of the annual flow of services from these endowments) falls between 0.3 and 3.5 and thus simply serves to smooth out the discretized income distribution by adding an endogenously determined component to the exogenous income endowment for each household. This causes the initial set of 20 income types to become 300 endowment types.
In the CGE model, ability levels take on five different possible discrete values, which are set to range from 1 to 10.
19 Empirical estimates of the correlation of parental and child income of 0.4 (Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992) are used as a proxy for the correlation of parental income and child ability; 20 i.e., I assign the five ability levels in equal measure, but distribute them in such a way as to make the correlation between parental income and child ability equal to 0.4. Given the 300 endowment types specified above, this addition of ability levels generates a total of 1,500 types.
To avoid problematic multiplicity of equilibria (Nechyba, 1999) , I assume a single utility function that applies to all households:
The determination of s is explored next, and the calibration of {k dh | d ∈ D, h ∈ H}, α and β is described in Section 3.5.
Production Function for School Quality.
Household peer quality is given by q(n) = (z(n) θ a(n) (1−θ) )/7.5. 21 Thus, as θ increases, the importance of parental income increases whereas that of child ability declines. One possible interpretation of this is that θ represents the degree to which peer effects work through the channel of parental monitoring as opposed to the child's inherent ability. Letting x be equal to per pupil spending and q be equal to average peer quality, household choices are then assumed to be made as if the school production function were accurately described by the constant returns to scale process:
Thus, a minimum per pupil spending level of 0.5 (i.e., $5,000) is required for a school to function, and school quality is determined as a combination of per pupil 19 These values are admittedly arbitrary, but sensitivity analysis has shown that changing either the mean or variance of these numbers has little qualitative or quantitative impact on the results presented in this article. 20 One can also interpret the correlation between parental and child income of 0.4 as an upper bound on the correlation between parental income and child ability because of the correlation of school quality and parental income. Sensitivity analysis with versions of the model that drive the correlation to 0, however, suggest this makes little difference for the results I report. 21 The function is divided by 7.5 in order to make peer quality similar in magnitude to per pupil spending. This is of no consequence other than that is eases the interpretation of the parameter ρ in the next equation.
spending and average peer quality. The minimum per pupil spending requirement adds some realism to the public choice process in that it does not permit majorities who attend private schools to vote for zero spending on public education, and it thus prevents simulations from finding trivial equilibria in which no public schools exist (Nechyba, 1999 (Nechyba, , 2000 . As will be seen shortly, the requirement is not a binding constraint in the benchmark equilibrium that replicates the New Jersey data in which all districts choose to spend more than $5,000 per pupil, but it does become a binding constraint under the hypothetical scenario of pure local financing.
Note that so long as ρ < 1, this implies that additional material resources (x) are viewed by parents as translating directly into gains in school quality. As noted in my previous work, this does not mean that the model necessarily takes a position in the ongoing debate over the role of school resources in the production of outcomes like test scores.
22 Rather, this model attempts to predict changes in parental choices as state financing regimes are changed, and, if parents think school resources matter for whatever reason, then this must be included in the analysis. It seems uncontroversial to say that there is in fact overwhelming evidence that per pupil spending does affect parental location and voting choices and thus does matter to parents. In fact, as will become clear below in the discussion of the calibration of θ and ρ, the model cannot replicate the observed mix of public and private schools unless both peer quality and per pupil spending are viewed as important by parents. This calibration is left to Section 3.5.
State Aid in New
Jersey. The CGE model contains state aid levels corresponding to those found in the representative districts in New Jersey in 1990. However, it is unclear from merely looking at state aid formulas to what extent aid is given in matching or block form. As I discuss elsewhere (MaCurdy and Nechyba, 2000) , a variety of political and fungibility questions obscures the actual aid transmission mechanism. For this reason, I constrain total state aid to each community to be equal to what is observed in the data, but I adjust the degree of matching versus block aid somewhat from district to district to more closely calibrate the actual spending levels that arise out of the political process. This requires a slight negative match rate in district 3 and a substantial positive match rate in district 1.
Calibration of Remaining Parameters.
Having specified the calibration of incomes and endowments, I now turn to the remaining preference and production function parameters. On the preference side, house quality parameters {k dh | d ∈ D, h ∈ H} as well as the Cobb-Douglas exponents α and β remain to be specified, as do ρ and θ on the production side.
The general strategy for a large part of this calibration is similar to that laid out in Nechyba (1997b Nechyba ( , 2000 . I assume an underlying utility function u(h, s, c) = h δ s α c β where h jointly captures housing and neighborhood quality and is interpreted as 22 Debate over this continues, as demonstrated by the recent work of Card and Krueger (1992) , Betts (1996) , Heckman et al. (1996) , Barro and Lee (1997) , Hanushek (1999) , and Krueger (1999) . the annualized flow of housing/neighborhood services. Given that s is determined in a Cobb-Douglas production process that places weight (1 − ρ) on per pupil spending x, we can rewrite this utility function as
where q is equal to peer quality and γ = q ρα . When treating h, x, and c as choice variables in an ordinary maximization problem, the exponents δ, (1 − ρ)α, and β can then, without loss of generality, be normalized to sum to 1 and interpreted as budget shares. Thus, I calculate the budget shares for h, x, and c for a hypothetical "median household" that consumes the imputed median annualized flow of housing/neighborhood services (in the data), earns the median income, and "chooses" the mean school spending level observed in the New Jersey districts, and I interpret these as δ, (1 − ρ)α, and β (equal to 0.22, 0.12, and 0.65, respectively).
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Of course, housing in the model is not a continuous variable h but rather consists of a discrete number of house/neighborhood quality levels {k dh | d ∈ D, h ∈ H}. I therefore combine the housing value distribution data from the School District Data Book with my estimate for δ to calibrate the 15 values for k dh across the three representative school districts. In particular, I take the housing distribution for all houses in districts of a particular type (i.e., low, middle, or high income as defined above), find house values at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentile (corresponding to neighborhoods 1 through 5 in district 1) and convert these to annualized housing flows (using a 5% interest rate). I then combine these annualized flow values with the exponent δ to arrive at the five housing (or neighborhood) quality parameters for this representative district. More precisely, suppose that for houses in districts falling into district category 3 (i.e., "high-income districts"), the annualized flow of housing services for a house at the 50th percentile of the distribution is 1.5 (corresponding to $15,000). The housing quality parameter for neighborhood 3 (the "median neighborhood") in district 3 is then just equal to (1.5) δ , i.e., k 23 = (1.5) δ = (1.5) 0.22 = 1.093. This procedure is then similarly applied to other district types to arrive at housing quality parameters for all neighborhoods in all representative districts. These parameters are reported in Table 3 . One small caveat is that, for purposes of identifying the size of capitalization effects clearly, one house quality level appears in all three communities: i.e., k 13 = k 22 = k 31 .
Although housing quality parameters as well as the exponent β have thus been determined, the values for α, ρ, and θ remain ambiguous. With respect to θ , I know of no consistent and reliable estimates from past work that can be helpful in determining the impact of parental socioeconomic status relative to child ability in determining peer externalities. However, in prior work (Nechyba, 2000) , I have argued that the precise value of θ has little bearing on many results, and this is similarly true in the present context. I therefore set θ to 0.5 24 . This leaves only α and ρ, and the calibration procedure above has placed a restriction on these values given that (1 − ρ)α is interpreted as the budget share of school spending for the median in the data. Again, there is little in the data or in prior empirical work that can be used to assign precise values to ρ and α. However, if ρ is set close to 0 (i.e., if school quality is determined primarily by spending levels rather than peer quality), private schools do not emerge in the model (even if private schools are heavily subsidized). Similarly, if ρ is set too close to 1 (i.e., if school quality is determined primarily by peer quality and not by spending), public schools cannot exist in equilibrium (even without private school subsidies). The level of ρ can then be set so as to yield the equilibrium level of private school attendance I observe in New Jersey. Note that this allows for private school attendance rates in the benchmark equilibrium to reflect those observed in districts 1 and 2, but the model has difficulty simultaneously replicating the actual private school attendance rates in district 3.
3.6. Benchmark Equilibrium. Table 4 gives a benchmark equilibrium for the New Jersey data. Note that per pupil spending levels as well as mean incomes closely mimic those found in the representative districts reported in Table 1 . Although not shown in the table, inter-jurisdictional differences and overlaps in housing prices are also similar to those found in the data, both for representative districts and for actual sample districts in New Jersey. Although this benchmark equilibrium is based on a replication of the state aid programs in New Jersey, it is worth noting that these programs are used only for calibration purposes. From here on out, the parameters that have been produced through this calibration 
PURE LOCAL VERSUS PURE STATE FINANCING
I begin by comparing results from pure local and pure state financing systems. Recall that under pure local financing, local (proportional) property tax rates are set by the voters of each school district, and all tax revenues are spent within the district. Under state financing, on the other hand, state (proportional) income taxes are set by voters in the whole state and distributed equally (on a per pupil basis) to all districts. Table 5 reports a variety of school-related variables such as the percentage of residents in each district that choose private schools, the per pupil spending levels in each district and the public school quality (as defined above) under these two public finance regimes. Furthermore, the table reports average property values, and it compares the combined cost of property taxes and house payments faced by households choosing the house type (k mh = 0.93) that exists in all three communities.
The most obvious feature of the table is that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the overall percentage of parents choosing private schools is slightly lower under state financing than under local financing, with districts 1 and 2 experiencing a decline in private school attendance and district 3 experiencing an increase. A closer inspection of the full simulation results reveals the underlying forces at work. First, public school quality in district 1 increases due to the substantially higher level of per pupil spending under state financing, and public school quality in district 3 declines for analogous reasons. This clearly leads to the direct effect of less private school attendance in the poor district and greater private school attendance in the rich district assuming all else (including residential location) remained the same. Second, whereas average property values change little, the opportunity cost of choosing certain houses in district 1 increases dramatically, which then sets off the indirect effect that leads private school attendees who previously chose district 1 because of lower housing costs to move to other districts. The latter indirect effect is not immediately transparent. First, recall that state income tax obligations are the same for a given household regardless of where that household resides. State income taxes are therefore sunk costs when households make residential location choices. Under local financing, on the other hand, property tax bills differ depending on where one lives, and so the price that is relevant for the households when making residential location choices under local financing is the property tax-inclusive house price. The last two columns of the table present the property tax inclusive price for a house of the same quality (k mh = 0.93) located in the three different districts. The ratio of the price of residing in such a house in district 1 to that of residing in the same house in district 3 is 0.45 under local financing but jumps to 0.63 under state financing-a 40% increase. As it turns out, this house is inhabited in part by private school attending households with relatively low incomes but high ability children under local financing but not under state financing. As the opportunity cost of residing in this house increases under state financing, these households move to similar houses in other districts and attend public schools.
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Two distinct causes for the drop in private school attendance under state financing therefore emerge. First, of those residing in district 1 under both financing regimes, marginal private school attendees under local financing may switch to public schools due to the increased quality of such schools (the direct effect). Second, local financing embeds a substantial incentive for private school attendees to trade off some house quality to live in the substantially cheaper but still acceptable neighborhoods of district 1 when sending their children to private schools. Under state financing, on the other hand, tax-inclusive prices for such houses rise substantially relative to similar houses in other districts, thus decreasing the incentive for families to accept lower-quality housing in district 1 when choosing private schools (the indirect effect). Some private school attendees in district 1 under local financing may therefore choose to reside in other districts under state financing. Of the decline in private school attendance in the poor district under state financing, two-thirds is due to out-migration of precisely such families, whereas the remaining one-third consists of high-ability households which switch to the improved local public school. 26 The indirect general equilibrium effect in the simulations is therefore quite significant. 25 For this house, even the before-tax price rises under centralization as the higher school quality is capitalized. (This is obvious from noting that even the after-tax price has increased.) Since average before-tax house prices in district 1 fall under centralization, this implies that some before-tax house prices in district 1 must be falling. As it turns out, capitalization effects within districts can be quite different within a district given the multiple factors that shift demand for various types of houses. 26 More precisely, when utility levels of private school attendees residing in district 1 under local financing are compared to utility levels assuming they went to public schools of quality equal to that In district 3, on the other hand, private school attendance rises for exactly analogous reasons. First, public school quality under state financing is lower due to less per pupil spending. This may cause marginal public school attendees under local financing to switch to private schools under state financing. Second, housing has become relatively cheaper (in terms of the relevant opportunity costs) in district 3, causing some private school attendees from other districts to immigrate. In the simulations, roughly half of the increase in private school attendance in district 3 occurs among populations that reside in that district under both finance systems (direct effect), and the remaining increase is due to migration (indirect effect).
Although the focus of the article is clearly to understand how partial and general equilibrium predictions of private school attendance differ, a few other features of Table 5 are noteworthy. First, per pupil public school spending drops as the system moves from one of local financing to that of state financing. This arises primarily from the well-understood effect of the skewedness of the state income distribution as demonstrated in Sonstelie and Silva (1995) . 27 Second, the decline in the average public school quality that accompanies centralization in Table 5 is entirely due to the decline in average per pupil spending and not because public schools use resources less efficiently under centralization (which is assumed away in this model). An assumption of a decline in public school efficiency with centralization could clearly be built into the model, and for modest declines in efficiency, private school attendance still declines with centralization. As public schools are assumed to be increasingly less efficient with centralization, of course, private school attendance eventually does increase when financing of public schools is moved from the local to the state level. Thus, the model suggests that the empirical observation of little response of private school attendance rates to centralization and equalization of public school financing cannot be taken as evidence that school resource efficiency remains unchanged. Rather, any empirical observation of an increase in private school attendance following centralization of public school financing is much more suggestive of declines in public school efficiency when viewed in a general equilibrium context than when viewed from a partial equilibrium analysis, and even a decline in private school attendance following centralization does not rule out a decline in public school efficiency.
CENTRALIZATION WITH LOCAL DISCRETION
Above, I have analyzed the two extremes-pure local and pure state financing. Virtually all public school finance systems in the United States, however, fall somewhere between these extremes. This section therefore explores how the general equilibrium forces identified in Section 4 translate into predictions for hybrid state/local public school funding. In particular, whereas the previous under state financing, only one-third of households from these private schools would switch to the higher quality public schools. 27 Under the median voter hypothesis, as one moves from local to state financing the determining factor for average per pupil spending moves from the mean to the median of the income distribution. Since the mean lies below the median, spending is predicted to fall. section focused on a particular type of centralization of public school financing, we now turn to more common types of central government involvement that involve block and matching grants combined with local discretion. The conclusion from this analysis is that private school attendance will drop much more significantly under centralization policies that allow for local discretion, in large part because high-income communities can maintain high levels of public spending under such state policies (and thus do not experience the direct effect of an increase in private school attendance). Additional declines in private school attendance can also arise from price (substitution) effects inherent in some types of state aid formulas. Therefore, the modest and counterintuitive decline in private school attendance from centralization observed in the previous section (where centralization allowed for no local discretion and included no price effects) represents a lower bound on the decline in private school attendance that can accompany centralization policies.
I will differentiate hybrid systems of state/local public financing along two dimensions. First, state aid formulas may or may not differentiate among districts based on district wealth, and second, aid to local school districts may take either the form of matching or block aid. In all cases I will assume that state aid is financed through the levy of a statewide (proportional) income tax. Matching and block aid is defined as in Nechyba (1996) Below, I begin the analysis with universal block grants, then proceed to discuss universal matching aid, and finally turn to aid specifically targeted to poor districts. In addition to the direct and indirect effects identified in the previous section for centralization through a state take-over, block grants give rise to a third "local discretion" effect, and matching grants add yet a fourth "price subsidy" effect. Each of these effects leads to a greater overall decline in private school attendance when grants are not targeted. When they are targeted, a similar conclusion follows for grants that are sufficiently large to be binding in the sense that they affect local public finance decisions.
5.1. Universal State Block Aid and the "Local Discretion" Effect. The first part of Table 6 focuses on results from introducing universal block grants. These types of grants share in common some of the same forces that were important in a switch from local to state funding of education, but they also contain some rather different incentives, which lead to some additional effects. In particular, state income taxes are used to substitute for a large part of local property taxes under both state financing and block grant financing, and thus both types of centralization cause tax payments to become less dependent on district choice. At the same time, large block grants differ from pure state financing in that they permit local districts to supplement state aid with local property taxes and thus to differ in their per pupil spending from other districts. This results in a combination of effects that, on balance, cause larger declines in private school attendance overall. More precisely, because an increasing fraction of public schools are funded through the state income tax, tax-inclusive house payments in district 1 rise relative to those in districts 2 and 3 even though property values themselves fall-just as in the case of state financing. Private school attendance in district 1 then declines with increasing block grants primarily because private school attending parents choose to migrate out of district 1 as relative prices rise-an effect again similar to what was observed in Section 4 for state financing. When block grants in district 1 become binding; i.e. as the block grant causes large increases in local public school spending, the public schools in district 1 gain substantially in quality, thus causing further declines in private school attendance-but now not merely from migration. This again is similar to the effects observed under a move to state financing. An important difference, however, arises in district 3 where, contrary to what is permitted under the state takeover, the high-income district can supplement the block grant with local property taxes. Centralization through block grants therefore embeds local discretion for higher income districts, which in turn causes private school attendance in those districts to decline rather than increase. This in turn mutes the general equilibrium effects in that the tax inclusive decline in the relative price of living in district 3 rather than district 1 is less pronounced (because house prices in district 3 still capitalize the higher spending on public schools in that district). Thus, block grants give rise to a smaller decline in private school attendance in district 1 than occurs under state financing, but this smaller decline is not offset by in increase in private school attendance in district 3 (as happens under state financing) because of the local discretion that is preserved under block grants but not under pure state financing. The combination of the direct and indirect effects at work in district 1 with the "local discretion" effects in district 3 then causes private school attendance rates on balance to decline more under centralization through block grants than under centralization through a state takeover.
Universal State Matching Aid and
The "Price-Subsidy" Effect. The second part of Table 6 provides simulation results for universal matching programs. As is well understood, the pure income effect of block grants is substantially weaker at stimulating local public spending than the combination of income and price effects embedded in matching aid. Increases in public school spending under matching aid are therefore significantly larger than those observed in the first portion of Table 6 for block grants, and the decline in private school attendance is correspondingly faster.
Note that in almost all cases, matching aid results in increases of school spending (as expected), with the exception of low matching rates in district 1. The latter anomaly is due to the assumption that a minimum of $5,000 in per pupil spending is required for schools to operate, and it makes low levels of matching aid in district 1 equivalent to small block grants that are passed on to residents through local property tax cuts. Ceteris paribus, a matching grant of 0.2 is thus equivalent to a block grant of 0.0844 for district 1. However, because even a matching grant of 0.2 leads to substantial increases in school spending in districts 2 and 3, a large drop in district 1's private school attendance is observed as previous high-ability private school attendees migrate to districts 2 and 3 to attend public schools. In fact, the entire drop in district 1's private school attendance for low levels of universal matching aid results from such migration.
Once matching aid rises above a critical level, public school spending and quality rise in all districts, accompanied by declines in private school attendance. Unlike for the case of low matching aid, however, an increasing portion of the remaining drops in private school attendance results from residents of each district switching from private schools to public schools-and a declining portion results from the migration effects identified above. Throughout, property values in district 1 decline relative to property values in other districts because of the decline in demand for housing in the poor district by households desiring private schools for their children. It is clear, however, that centralization through universal matching aid not only leads to declines in private school attendance, but eventually, because of the increasingly large price subsidies that induce districts to raise per pupil spending, to the complete vanishing of all private schools (as matching rates in the public sector rise high enough). Centralization through matching grants is therefore accompanied by much larger declines in private school attendance than centralization through a state take-over or through block grants. This decline is now due to (i) the direct and indirect effects identified for the previous two forms of centralization, (ii) the "local discretion" effect identified for block grants, and (iii) the price-subsidy effect unique to matching grants. 5.3. Targeted State Aid. Finally, Table 7 reports simulation results involving matching and block grants targeted only to district 1. Again, the top portion of the table begins with block grants, and the lower portion proceeds with different levels of matching grants. However, this time no grants are provided to other districts, leaving public school spending there relatively unchanged and causing property values in district 1 to rise relative to those in districts 2 and 3. Since property taxes in district 1 decline, however, tax-inclusive property values in district 1 relative to those in districts 2 and 3 are unchanged, which implies that the general equilibrium (indirect) effects pointed to in all previous cases are largely absent for targeted grants. Thus, targeted grants are the first form of centralization that does not give rise to the counterintuitive effect highlighted in this article. More specifically, for block aid levels that do not bind (i.e., aid levels below $5,000), per pupil public school spending in district 1 remains unchanged, and local taxes are reduced as state aid increases. Property values therefore rise not because of an improvement in public schools, but rather because local property taxes decline-thus leaving tax-inclusive property values essentially unchanged relative to those in other districts. Although this precludes a significant general equilibrium effect, it does lead to income effects for households in district 1 as local property taxes are replaced by state income taxes (largely paid by residents of districts 2 and 3). These income effects in turn cause some marginal public school attending households in district 1 to switch to private schools. Since the marginal public school attendees are of high peer quality, this then causes a decline in public school quality (as average peer quality in the public school declines), thus causing an additional increase in private school attendance that would not have occurred had public school quality remained unchanged. Since nothing of significance happens in the remaining districts, low levels of targeted block aid therefore lead to an overall increase in private school attendance (from 20% to roughly 23%). The decline in district 1 private school attendance that we have come to expect from the previous tables then only occurs as the block grant begins to bind (in the sense that public school spending in the district rises). Private school attendance then also falls modestly in other districts as some marginal households move to district 1 due to the improvements in public school quality.
As noted in the previous discussion on matching grants, low levels of such grants are in fact equivalent to block grants in the poor community. Thus, for low levels of matching aid (m = 0.2 is roughly equivalent to b = 0.0844) in the second part of Table 7 , effects precisely analogous to those for block grants occur. However, as matching grants become larger and the price subsidy effect kicks in, private school attendance begins to decline as public school quality increases in district 1. For both targeted block and matching aid, we therefore observe the same general trend as for universal grants or state take-overs so long as those targeted grants are binding on the poor district's public school funding choices: private school attendance falls as the result of centralization.
CONCLUSION
This article simulates the impact of different public school financing schemes on private school attendance rates in a multidistrict economy where the eligibility of a child to attend a public school is based on the parents' place of residence. The model is rather general and permits for households to choose where to live, whether to send their children to public or private schools, and how to vote on local or state public school spending. The computable general equilibrium version of the model is then able to replicate most of the salient features observed in data for school districts in New Jersey. The results then suggest that careful attention to general equilibrium effects in school finance debates is indeed required for an accurate interpretation of some of the empirical developments as school finance laws have undergone revisions over the past three decades. For example, some of the results stand in stark contrast to the presumption that school finance centralization accompanied by little change in private school attendance rates is evidence against the hypothesis that centralization leads to less efficient utilization of resources within the public school sector.
More precisely, although a cursory look at the local public finance literature has persuaded some observers to conclude that centralization of public school finances in such an economy will lead to increases in private school attendance, the results here suggest the opposite (so long as centralization is not accompanied by substantial decreases in the efficiency of resource uses in public schools). In particular, the article points to two distinct effects when pure local and pure state financing are compared. First, the "direct" (or partial equilibrium) effect of centralization leads to lower private school attendance in poor districts where resources for schools increase as a result of state financing and higher private school attendance in wealthy districts where the opposite is true. Second, an "indirect" (general equilibrium) effect emerges as state financing leads to a sharp increase in the opportunity cost of private school attendees choosing to reside in poor communities in order to take advantage of low-cost housing and low property tax bases. When centralization occurs through state block grants rather than pure state financing, a third ("local discretion") effect emerges as private school attendance no longer increases in the wealthy districts because these districts are given the discretion to spend beyond the state block grant through local property tax revenues. On balance, the simulations suggest that private school attendance falls more under block grants than under pure state financing. Finally, when centralization involves the use of matching grants, a familiar fourth ("price subsidy") effect emerges, leading to yet greater declines in private school attendance under centralization.
